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Asprox Overview
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 Brief History
 Asprox botnet has been around since 2007
 Initially used exclusively for sending phishing emails
 Around May 2008, a new update was pushed to Asprox bots
 an attempt to grow the size of the botnet
 SQL injection vector
 A significant number of web servers have since been 
attacked and their unsuspecting visitor machines turned 
into Asprox bots
Multistep Life Cycle of Asprox
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Data on SQL-injecting Asprox Bots
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Collection Period 8/9/2008 ~ 8/25/2008 (17 days)
Unique IP addresses of attacking bots 57,419
Autonomous systems attackers belonged to 1,847
Web servers targeted 581
 Information about Asprox bots that attacked web servers 
at Indiana University in August 2008
 SQL-injection attacks
Data on JavaScript-Delivery Hosts
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Collection Period 10/26/2008 ~ 1/31/2009 (98 days)
Unique Hostnames 324
With gTLDs 151 (.com: 105, .name:28, .mobi:11, .net:4, .org:3)
With ccTLDs 173 (.ru:127, .cn:34, .jp:4, .cc:4, .tk:1, .kz:1, .eu:1, .me:1)
Resolved hostnames 55
IP addresses 2,214
ASes 308
BGP prefixes 898
Countries 64
Resolved hostnames 619
IP addresses 147
ASes 67
BGP prefixes 115
Countries 11
 JavaScript-delivery hosts
 JavaScript-delivery hosts  DNS servers for JavaScript-
delivery hosts
Data on Infected Web Servers (1/2)
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 Data collection
 Searched web pages containing the URLs pointing to the 
malicious JavaScript delivery hosts
 Used Google and Yahoo search APIs
 Examined web pages in search results, including the cached 
pages
 Web-server classification in the search results
 Infected but unreachable
 Infected, reachable, but undecidable
 Infected, reachable, and identifiable
Data on Infected Web Servers (2/2)
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 Data collection period
 11/01/2008 ~ 01/31/2009 (92 days)
Class # of Servers %
Total # of infected web servers 8,926 100%
Infected but unreachable 2,751 30.82%
Infected, reachable, but undecidable 1,141 12.78%
Infected, reachable, and identifiable 5,034 56.40%
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Analysis of Asprox Bots
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 The number of attacking bots is lesser on weekdays than 
weekends
 Artifact of the fact that many bots are residential machines
 New bots are added to the pool as the week progresses, 
with peaks on Saturdays
 Modest number (up to 3,000) of bots are being reused
 More bots are reused on weekend like the trend of the new 
bot addition
Attack Times by Asprox Bots
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 Asprox bots attacking on a 
weekend day (8/9)
 Asprox bots attacking on a 
weekday (8/20)
Active Lifetime and Repeated Attacks
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 Around 95% of attacking bots were observed for less 
than 2 days
 Helps avoid any IP blacklisting
 Over 50% of web servers were continuously attacked for 
8 days
 90% of the bots attacked the same web server about 10 
times
 In some cases, one attacker hit the same target over 500 times
Geographical Distribution of Asprox Bots
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36.68% of 
the attacking 
bots
JavaScript-Delivery Hosts
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 Only 27 out of 55 JavaScript delivery hosts were actively 
used during our data collection period
 Among the 27 JavaScript delivery hosts, 58% of them 
appear to be actively fluxing.
 One example, www.berkje.ru
 1,542 IP addresses
 Geographically spread through 60 countries
# of IP addresses and IP diversity for 
www.berkje.ru
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Geo. Dist. of IPs of JavaScript-Delivery Hosts
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65.9% of 
JavaScript-
Delivery hosts
Infected Web Servers
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TLD Number of web servers
.com 2,307
.pl 341
.net 313
.org 294
.cn 242
.kr 201
.uk 125
Other gTLDs 105
Other ccTDLs 1,070
No server name, just IP address 36
Total Number of web servers 5,034
 TLDs of infected web servers
Infected Web Servers
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 Cleaned web servers  Still infected web servers
 77% of the servers were cleaned and the rest stayed 
infected during our collection period.
Conclusion
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 Asprox botnet continues to grow and infect web servers 
around the world
 Passive monitoring such as Honeypot is not sufficient 
 to understand the attack in its entirety or 
 to detect changes or modifications to the final vulnerabilities 
used to attack users’ machines or the malware payload 
delivered
 Adopting the mitigation for the SQL injection attacks 
would take a long education cycle 
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